Solipsism
We are all familiar with the Cartesian thought experiment —how do we know reality is real? How do we know that there isn’t an evil demon, both clever and deceitful as well as powerful, manufacturing a superficial world for us?
There is no way to know for sure right? But that world is painfully lonely and barren. So how do we escape the mess that is Cartesian doubt, this unbearable skepticism about even our simplest perceptions?
Descartes answered this himself — with his famous quote, “Cogito ergo sum.” By doubting his own existence, this showed that he existed; since he cannot doubt if he did not exist. By doubting, he is a thinking thing. I think therefore I am.
Good. We know that we ourselves exist. But what of everyone else?
The theory that only one’s mind exists, is known as solipsism. It is not so much a denial of material existence, but the denial of the existence of other minds.
Imagine we’re at a party; silhouettes crossing each other, becoming larger and sharper as they come towards us, the shapes becoming less distinct as they walk away.
Consider the two realities:
One; the silhouettes are just that. Silhouettes. They are not in fact real people but constructed by an evil demon. They are things. But life is too unbearable to treat them as such; we treat them as people. We treat thing as person.
Or two; the other people are in fact real and not just walking dolls mimicking their human counterparts. But we are so deeply implanted into this skeptical solipsistic worldview and through the malicious evil demon model of the world, only ‘I exist’. So we treat people as if they were not. We treat person as thing.
And then, comes the next question — which solipsism is better?
Treating thing as person does no harm, surely? Is it not a benign, endearing thing for a child to comfort her doll as if it was upset? Or throwing coins into a holy river in return for her generosity, and prosperity that she will bring you. Or scolding the corner of the bed after he stubs his toe as if it has violated him in some way.
Treating a person as thing, on the other hand, is to dehumanise them, to degrade them, to make them into an object, to subordinate them. It is a concern to philosophers, and a largely incontestable stance that is shared is that we should treat other humans not as a means to an end, rather than an end in themselves.
Feminists, too, are concerned about this type of solipsism and disturbed by the treating of women as things; through the oppression and objectification of women.
Simone de Beauvoir described oppression as the subordination of a free human being into an object:
“A free and autonomous being… — nevertheless finds herself living in a world where men compel her to assume the status of the Other. They propose to stabilise her as an object…In the company of a living enigma man remains alone. [This] is for many a more attractive experience than an authentic relationship with a human being.”
The message, then, is that the failure to recognise the humanity of others leads to solipsism, then solipsism is not merely a problem for epistemology, but a moral, political and societal problem.
Sexual solipsism
Rae Langton coined the term ‘sexual solipsism’. That is, someone treats a thing as a person, in a sexual context; or that someone treats a person as a thing, in a sexual context.
How might one treat a thing as a person, sexually? One must animate things. He may not believe the thing to be a person, but he treats it as if it were. He may talk to a doll, praising it or berating it, as if it were a real woman. And then he may have sex with it, as if it were a woman. The sex may not be real, but the sexual experience is.
Or consider pornography. The women in the videos are real (unless one is watching hentai — but that is a whole other solipsistic inception to. be delved into later). But real as the women on the screen are, the man consuming the pornography is not having sex with a woman. Of course, woman watch pornography too, but we use man here for simplicity, and for the reason that the consumers of pornography are, for the large part, male. There are implications for women using pornography, but we will return to this later.
Essentially, the man is using pornography, a thing, in place of a woman. He is treating a thing as a woman. MacKinnon says of the consumption of pornography:
“Sex between people and things, human beings and pieces of paper, real men and unreal women.”
Melinda Vadas goes onto define pornography as:
“Any object that has been manufactured to satisfy sexual desire through its sexual consumption, or other sexual use as a women” where “as” means “in the role, function, or capacity of (a woman).
There may be some reactive attitudes, that is attitudes belonging to participation with others in interpersonal relationships, and not others, or the projection of some human qualities and not others. In some ways, pornography may fall short of treating a thing as a person. There are further implications of treating a thing that represents a person in a way that falls short of a person. We return to this point later.
If real women exist, why then, does pornography seem such an appealing option to men? Quoting Beauvoir, why is pornography, “for many, a more attractive experience than an authentic relationship with a human being?”
We can talk about the imbalance of sexual opportunity between the genders. Women are more selective in choosing their sexual partner than their male counterparts. It has become somewhat of a incel-platitude to mention the Pareto Principle, that is, 80% of women want to have sex with the top 20% of men. The so-called ‘chads’.
The men who aren’t the top 20% of men have two choices; they can either accept the harsh domain of sexual selection and try to become more desirable so they can enjoy the privileges of the top 20%; or they can reject the game altogether, and either coerce real women, who otherwise would not, to have sex with them. Or construct a false reality in which they can have sex with whoever they wanted, whenever they wanted, however they wanted, without the risk of attracting real women and the stings of rejection that it might lead to.
In pornography, you can take your pick — the men become the choosers. The men are the sexual selectors; and the women are patiently waiting there, a click away from being chosen. And the man needs only focus on himself, his own pleasure — he doesn’t need to ask for consent; he possesses her from the moment he lays eyes on her. There is no responsibility for the wellbeing for the Other. There is no aftercare — just close the tab like it was never opened, shut the screen and fall asleep.
We might consider the stance of the ‘pornography is harmless’ camp. The pro- things as people solipsism camp. Surely it hurts no one? Sure, a man degrades and humiliates the woman in his imagination — no one is hurt by an imaginary world?
As well as the solipsism of animating things, there is the solipsism of objectifying people. Both have their sexual contexts. Feminists often talk of women being treated as an object, a thing; and ought not to be. Kant goes further to say of sexual desire:
“Sexual love makes of the loved person an object of appetite; as soon as that appetite has been stilled, the person is cast aside as one casts away a lemon that has been sucked dry.”
There is a claim that pornography objectifies women; it turns women into mere bodies and experiences that are not free, but things that can be possessed, used as a masturbatory accessory. MacKinnon says that in pornography, things are treated as women, and women are treated as things — when sex becomes solipsistic in one way, it becomes solipsistic in the other:
“What was words and pictures becomes, through masturbation, sex itself. As the industry expands, thus becomes more and more the generic experience of sex…In other words, as the human becomes thing and the mutual becomes one-sided and the given becomes stolen and sold, objectification comes to define femininity, and one-sidedness comes to define mutuality, and force comes to define consent as pictures and words become the forms of possession and use through which women are actually possessed and used.”
When sex with a thing becomes the norm, ‘the human becomes thing’. There are two claims: treating things as women leads to women being treated as things. Treating things as women is to treat women as things.
Rae Langton and MacKinnon argued that the first claim is true but insufficient. They would like to go further to argue that ‘pornography is subordination (not merely depicting, and causing it). To understand this, we might consider seeing pornography as a kind of speech.
Speech Acts
There is something missing in the free speech debates — on the one hand, libertarians say ‘sticks and stones might break my bones, but words will never hurt me’ — but then they staunchly defend their freedom of speech, ‘you cannot take away my free speech!’. Words certainly have the capacity to hurt or to heal. Words can refuse treatment; or refuse sex. Words can protest, they can plead. So, speech matters— but more importantly, it is what we can do with our speech.
It is the vehicle by which we convey meanings and express ourselves. And why do we want to express ourselves? Well, sometimes we hope that it will lead to an action (or an inaction). We say to the gunman, “please don’t shoot me!” not merely to say words or express ourselves— but so to convey to the gunman not to shoot me, and then lead to the action (or inaction) of not shooting me.
Pornography is speech — but it is more than that. It is a kind of ‘speech act’. In linguistics, a speech act is an utterance that not only presents information but performs an action as well.
We will discuss 3 types of speech act.
- Locutionary act
- Perlocutionary act
- Illocutionary act
There is the utterance — the locution (e.g. “Do you have a tissue?”). The locutionary act achieves the meaning of the utterance (i.e. “I would like you to pass me a tissue.”). The perlocutionary act achieves a particular effect (i.e. you passing me a tissue). The illocutionary act is the action constituted by the utterance itself and is related to the intent of the speaker (e.g. to request, to warn, to ask, to order). By saying “do you have a tissue”, you pass me a tissue. This is the perlocutionary act. In saying “do you have a tissue”, I am requesting for a tissue. Or in another circumstance, if I was a master and you are a slave, the illocutionary force may be that of a demand rather than an ask.
So, we see that the illocutionary act depends on the felicity conditions, that is fixed by convention, with the appropriate participants present. Sometimes, one performs an illocution (asking for a tissue) that one does not intend to perform (may be taken as demanding a tissue). So, intention is not always a necessary felicity condition. Or one might fail to perform an illocution one intends to perform (e.g. I ask a dummy to pass me a tissue). The required participants (i.e. another person) is not present, thus, the felicity conditions have not been satisfied.
Speech and power
Political power includes the ability to perform speech acts of certain kinds (not merely express speech). It may go further than that — you may also have the ability to silence the speech of the less powerful.
Imagine a high ranking Nazi politician says, “Jews are not permitted to hold citizenship.”
- Locutionary — by ‘Jews’ he means Jewish people
- Perlocutionary — the effect is that Jewish people do not hold citizenship, and thus do not enjoy political rights.
- Illocutionary — it makes the case that Jewish people cannot become citizens.
It is clear in this example, that this utterance subordinates, that is, to put a group in a position of inferiority or loss of power. Illocutionary acts of subordination have three features:
- Ranks…as inferior
- Legitimate discriminatory behaviour
- Deprive….of some important powers
Only a person in a position of authority or power can subordinate. Thus, subordinating speech acts are authoritative speech acts.
Pornographic speech acts
We must be careful not to assume that ‘harm to women’ is automatically evidence for the claim that ‘pornography is subordination’. Besides, ‘harm to smokers’ does not necessarily mean subordination.
In this essay, I will do little to defend the claim that pornography depicts subordination — as it is quite clear. With the man being the prime consumer, it is no wonder pornography is designed for the male gaze. It involves eroticising sexual violence and aggression towards women, and it comes to define the normal practice of sex.
Pornography subordinates
Let’s first look at the first claim: that pornography is a perlocutionary act of subordination.
- It ranks women as sex objects; thus inferior to men.
- It legitimises sexual violence. By depicting abusive sexual behaviour “in such a way to endorse the degradation”. It “sexualises rape, battery, sexual harassment…and child abuse; it…celebrates, promotes, authoritises and legitimates them” (MacKinnon).
- It deprives women of equal status in society
And what of the felicity conditions? That is, do the speakers have authority? One might argue, no, pornography has no impact on how men view sex and women — or you might say, yes, it does have an educational element. It teaches boys how to treat women. And how sex should be. For many young people, pornography is the first exposure to sex; and for frequent consumers, the pornographic sexual experience becomes their definition of sex. Sex then becomes the vehicle by which they play out their pornographic fantasies and real women become the instrument by which they do so.
We then look to the uptake — one might argue, pornography is just entertainment, simply escapist storytelling. Or is it subordination? And who should be the judge? Those who actually produce and consume pornography? Or the women as they can tell better what ranks them as inferior, and denigrates them? Either way, we need to privilege one class over the other.
If pornography subordinates, then it is not because of its content but rather its authority. Because if we take away that authority, then there is no legitimatising and thus no depriving of important powers.
Pornography silences
The second feminist claim, as put forward by Rae Langton, is pornography silences. This might seem like a far-reaching claim — but it may have more solid footing than the first claim.
We look at the types of silencing
- Simple silence — silence, lack of utterance, due to fear, or intimidation, or the belief that no one will listen. Failure to perform even the locutionary act.
- Perlocutionary frustration — performs the intended illocution but fails to perform the intended perlocutionary act
- Illocutionary disablement — utterance fails both to achieve the intended effect (perlocutionary act) and the very action intended (illocutionary act)
For example, refusal in sexual contexts. The word ‘no’ may be used to refuse sex or prevent further advances. A woman may be silenced in three ways; she may not say ‘no’ out of fear or intimidation (simple silencing). Or she may say ‘no’, and the man acknowledges it as a refusal, but proceeds anyway (perlocutionary frustration). In saying ‘no’, she refuses (illocutionary act); by saying no, the sex is not prevented (perlocutionary act failed). If pornography legitimates rape, it does so by endorsing and sexualising the use of force in response to refusal. Refusal itself is eroticised.
A refusal may be silenced by illocutionary disablement. A woman may say ‘no’ but it is not even recognised as a refusal. ‘She wants it really’ he might think to himself. Refusal, in that context, is unspeakable.
If men can rape without knowing it, because pornography legitimises rape and sets it within normal sexual practices (normalises it), then women can have their voices silenced. If pornography sets up the rules in the language games of sex, then it indeed has authority — one that can silence real women in real life.
And what about real women enjoying degradation, humiliation, force?
That is not for me to say what one enjoys and what one doesn’t — but psychology tells us that desires are not always independently formed, as rational and autonomous as we like to think we are, and there are often many layers to it.
Pornography not only depicts our fantasies but it creates them. It is desire-shaping. It tells us what we should find erotic and be turned on by. Partly, because it conditions the reward system. And it is not only the man that objectifies and has objectifying attitudes towards women; women can self-objectify. She may view herself as an object of desire; she may see her sole purpose to satisfy desire. And if that is her goal, she may be conditioned to enjoy pain, humiliation, degradation, force.
Overcoming Solipsism
This is by no means a complete inquiry into sexual dynamics and pornography. I do not propose a solution to the problem; I have not even touched on the issue of censorship, nor have I mentioned the porn industry and its exploitations. I only propose that there is a problem. And that it is more insidious than we might think on first glance. Sexual solipsism certainly drives a wedge between the sexes; and casts a dark shadow on relationships. So the question arises, how do we escape solipsism? Or better still, how do we overcome solipsism?
We all have, arguably, been solipsists at some point — we start our lives off as infant solipsists. It is our world and everyone is in it. And then at some point, as children, we infer that others are independent entities and have their own experiences, and then we reject solipsism.
In adult life, we continue to battle solipsism. It is no wonder we are lonely — we experience our mind only. Even then, we sometimes struggle to even understand it. And then we catch glimpses of the Other experiences. Kant proposed that the solution to solipsism is friendship and love. It is, in short, real, genuine relationships. We need to do an awful lot of humanising. Perhaps we can overcome Beauvoir’s fear and instead, make authentic relationships with human beings a far more attractive experience.
